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LOU HENKIN, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
AND THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE

Juan M~ndez*
It's an immense honor and a privilege to have been invited to
participate in a tribute to Lou Henkin. Even if that were not the
occasion, just the honor of sharing a panel with Judge Barkett and
with Dean Koh is enough to overwhelm anybody and it does
overwhelm me. I hope you will sympathize with me for having to
follow them. It is especially overwhelming because as I look around
the room, I see so many people who are much more deserving than I
am to be here and to be honored in the way you have honored me in
inviting me to speak today.
I am very glad to have been invited because I feel that I owe
Lou Henkin a huge debt of gratitude. He has inspired not only my
dabbling with teaching international human rights law from time to
time, but even more conspicuously, he inspired my longer term
participation and advocacy in civil society's war in the trenches to
defend and promote human rights. In both of those roles I have had
many occasions to draw inspiration from Lou's wisdom and from his
dedication and stubbornness in insisting on principle and not letting
us depart from the ultimate goal of protecting human rights.
I particularly want to refer to the Aspen Institute Seminar
for Judges that Alice began.' I had the privilege of teaching in
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Alice Henkin began the Justice and Society Program 23 years ago to

convene leaders from several disciplines and professions to help shape U.S.
policies on human rights, international law, transnational justice, and
multilateral peacekeeping field operations. See Aspen Institute's Justice and
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several of the seminars over a three or four year period. 2 In each one,
I had glimpses of Lou's inspiration. Lou was able to create an
atmosphere of reflection and dialogue with very experienced judges
from all over the country and from abroad in a way in which only
very few certainties were exposed.
Mostly the seminars were an opportunity to share
experiences about what needs to be done to protect human rights and
how can we do it. But in addition, there was always an exploration,
an inquiry, a sharing of experiences that nevertheless had one basic,
fundamental, moral certainty, which left all of us, as Judge Barkett
said, wanting more after each session. First, that certainty was that
the principles of human rights are born from the inherent dignity of
every person of every race, religion, national origin, or any other
status. Second, that because those human rights are born from that
inherent equality and dignity of everyone on the planet, there are
also obligations that the state must perform. And third, that within
the state it is the responsibility of courts and of judges to provide
those guarantees and defenses for the protection of human rights
that the state is obligated to perform.
In addition, at Aspen there was always some discussion
about the question whether, if these are really international human
rights, then doesn't the international community have a
responsibility both to come to the assistance of states when they try
in earnest to protect and defend human rights, but also when they
don't? And in particular there was a discussion of the responsibility
of powerful, large states with long traditions of law to be the
protectors of rights within their own system and also to expand their
protection to everyone who needs our assistance everywhere in the
world. I think those are valuable lessons both for the teaching of
international human rights law and also for the practice of advocacy.
I have been asked today to address some new dimensions in
which human rights advocacy is evolving in today's world. In that
sense, I have to say from the start, that it all comes back to these
essential truths that we learned originally form Lou Henkin.
I have chosen to talk about two new horizons of human rights
Society Program, http://www.aspeninstitute.org/site/c.huLWJeMRKpH/b.855237/
apps/nlcontent3.asp?contentjid={252D64EB-98F5-4462-923FA6A41D50A20D}&notoc=1.
2.
Mdndez began teaching seminars on International Law of Human
Rights for Judges at the Aspen Institute in June 1990.
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protection. They are, not coincidentally, the ones that I am currently
working on today: transitional justice and the prevention of genocide.
These are only two of the ways in which human rights advocacy and
activity is evolving. There are many other very exciting ways to
advocate for human rights today, for example, in the defense of the
principle of non-discrimination and of equality. There are also
exciting ways in which economic, social, and cultural rights are
finally leaving their second-class citizenship status and people are
experimenting with ways to make them a more realistic demand that
we can effectively obtain from states, as we do with civil and political
rights.
Though I have chosen these two a little bit arbitrarily, I think
they also reflect the reason we are gathered here today. Transitional
justice is not a very good term, but it has become sort of a term of art
to describe how we help societies leave behind a legacy of massive
and systematic human rights violations and start on the path to a
more humane dispensation of rights and a more democratic society.
In particular, transitional justice asks, what does the newly
democratic state that we are trying to create owe to the victims of
those human rights violations that are part of the recent legacy?
That phenomenon, which has been taking different shapes in
different parts of the world over the last twenty years, and which is
increasing as we speak and presents more facets and dimensions
every day, has created a series of what we call emerging norms. And
when we say emerging norms, we don't mean that they are new.
Instead, we mean that they are new ways of interpreting norms that
have been in the human rights canon all along. In that sense, they
are emerging norms because they are interpreted by authoritative
organs and bodies and courts-both domestic and international-and
international organs like international human rights courts and
treaty bodies, special rapporteurs, and working groups, in giving life
and giving essence to core principles of human rights protection.
And there, again, I will share an anecdote. In one of the
Aspen Institute seminars convened very early on by Alice Henkin to
deal precisely with the question of how to deal with accountability in
international human rights law, Lou gave us some of the first
instincts about how we could combat the proliferation of blanket
amnesty laws that either dictators pass for themselves-like
Pinochet did in 1978-or that military establishments obtainedsometimes literally at the point of a gun-from weak democratic
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governments that succeeded them. During conversations in Aspen, I
heard Lou state the very simple truth that if the prohibition on
torture means anything, and if the prohibition on extrajudicial
execution means anything, it is not only that we don't condone them
at the time that they happen, but that we don't ex post facto
legitimize them by allowing an amnesty of this sort to be part of the
law. Over the years, that basic instinct has been taken into account
many times by decisions of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, 3 by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 4 and
also in many parts of Latin America by domestic courts that, though
they don't cite Lou Henkin's writings, do inherit the thinking behind
what Lou Henkin has written, and have created a whole current of
judicial opinion that owes a lot to Lou Henkin's legacy. 5
With respect to transitional justice, those emerging norms
create obligations of the state toward the victims and toward society
at large. One of those obligations is to tell the truth. Especially where
there has been denial and refusal to acknowledge human rights
abuses, the state has an obligation to explore the truth to the best of
its abilities and to disclose it publicly. That has become known as a
right to truth.6 Whether we call it a right or not, the obligation of the
3.
See Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdamez v. El Salvador, Case
11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 37/00, OEA/Ser.I/VIII.106, doc. 6 para. 4
(1999-2000) (holding that El Salvador violated the right to life of Archbishop
Monsignor Romero under the American Convention for failing to investigate his
extrajudicial execution and rendering null and void general amnesty law);
Carmelo Soria Espinoza v. Chile, Case 11.725, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
133/99, OEA/Ser.LV/II.106, doc. 6 para. 2 (1999-2000) (finding that Chilean
State's dismissal of criminal proceedings and adoption of self-amnesty law
constituted violation of the rights to liberty and personal integrity of murdered

international official).
4.
I/A Court H.R., Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru, Judgment of Mar.
14, 2001, Series C, No. 8, para 167 (holding that self-amnesty laws are manifestly

incompatible with the American Convention and lack any legal effect).
5.
See e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJNI, 6/1412005, "Sim6n, Julio
Hector y otros s/privaci6n ilegitima de la libertad". S.1767.XXXVIII (Arg.)
[hereinafter Sim6n] (striking down Argentina's two amnesty laws). Full text in
Spanish, availableat http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/doc/nulidad.html.

6.
See e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147
para. 24, AIRES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006) (discussing obligations of states to

"develop means of informing the general public," particularly victims of human
rights and humanitarian law violations); see also Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In
Vindication of Justiciable Victims' Rights to Truth and Justice for State-

2007]

LOU HENKIN AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

481

state very honestly to explore every detail of what happened in a
legacy of human rights abuses is now so well established that almost
nobody denies it anymore. 7 And, of course, there are many ways that
this obligation is implemented, of which truth commissions are only
one.
The state's second obligation is to justice. And by justice, we
mean criminal prosecution of those responsible for perpetrating
violations that are so grave and so massive that they constitute
crimes against humanity or war crimes if they were committed in the
context of armed conflict. The fact that there is a very well
established principle does not mean that it is easy to prosecute and to
punish human rights violators. Nonetheless, the principle is very
well established now and almost no country claims to be able to pass
8
blanket amnesty laws anymore.
The state's third obligation is that the victims are owed
reparations that acknowledge their plight as victims and their
dignity as human beings and as citizens, and recognize them as part
of the new dispensation of rights.
The state's fourth obligation is institutional reform and
vetting so that those who have abused their power in institutions like
the police or the armed forces are no longer able to remain in their
positions and to abuse the power of those institutions to commit
human rights abuses.
Those are four principles that can be clearly traced to
decisions of international bodies and that constitute emerging
obligations. Sometimes, we also talk about reconciliation. While that
is not one of these obligations, we do recognize that in some cases,
especially when the conflict has had ethnic or religious dimensions, it
will be necessary not only for the state to fulfill these four obligations
Sponsored Crimes, 35 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1399, 1439-42 (2002) (discussing
importance of right to truth in "substantive" and "procedural" aspects).
7.
For discussion of the right to truth, see Aldana-Pindell, supra note 6,
1439-44 (2002); see also Jose Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and
PoliticalConstraints:The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human
Rights Violations, 43 Hastings L.J. 1425, 1433 (1992) (discussing the belief that
truth was an indispensable value in dealing with the legacy of the "disappeared"
in Chile); see also Juan E. Mndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 Hum. Rts.
Q. 255 (1997) (discussing the role of accountability in dealing with massive
human rights violations).
8.
For a recent example of a country striking down its own amnesty laws,
see Sim6n, supra note 5.
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in good faith and to the best of its abilities, but also to engage in
some form of inter-communal, inter-community conversations that
can bear the name of reconciliation. 9
Of course these obligations are not a menu from which states
can choose. They are obligations that have to be approached
holistically, comprehensively, and in good faith. Nevertheless, they
are obligations of means and not obligations of results. So as long as
the effort is conducted in good faith, we still need to understand that
the full truth will never be known, full justice to everyone will never
be achieved, and reparations will always leave us with a sense that
more should have been done. It is important, therefore, to have a
sense of a holistic, comprehensive approach to these obligations.
Moreover, the public policies that lead to these mechanisms of
transitional justice have to be adopted in full consultation with the
major stakeholders-the whole citizenry, and especially the victims
of human rights abuses, the members of the communities that have
borne the brunt of the oppression. Their participation, their
consultation about their needs, is essential to a successful policy.
Transitional justice is no longer limited to the moment of
transition from dictatorship to democracy or from conflict to peace.
Many of these mechanisms are applied even during ongoing conflicts
and much before a real transition to democracy can be envisioned.
This is the reality of how societies learn from each other and try to
emulate each other. More importantly, because they are universal
principles, we should be careful not to apply them only to moments of
transition because the risk is that we won't recognize that the state
has these obligations under all conditions and under every situation.
Applying these principles only at the transitional moment tends only
to lower the standards rather than heighten them. And so it is very
important to use these principles whenever they are applicable.
This brings us to situations in which transitional justice
mechanisms have to be applied during ongoing conflict and for
ongoing violations. There, as you can imagine, the complications are
much greater. Now we find ourselves having these debates among

9.
See Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the
21st Century, 46 St. Louis. U. L.J. 293, 311-12 (2002) ("[Slocieties in which largescale

human rights abuses have occurred

. . . need to achieve internal

reconciliation to make the transition to the next phase of their political existence.
• . . [The truth and reconciliation commissions]

created in South Africa,

Guatemala, El Salvador, and most recently in Sierra Leone [are examples].").
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people from human rights communities, conflict resolution
communities, and humanitarian organizations delivering aid on the
ground. Unfortunately, these debates-as to whether peace should
trump justice or justice is more important than peace-take place in
this very simplistic yet urgent way. When confronted with questions
like whether the International Criminal Court should withdraw the
indictments of the Lord's Resistance Army leaders for the sake of
peace in Northern Uganda, we are forced to decide quickly without
first putting the burden on the parties to the conflict and to the peace
talks to show that their intent for peace is serious. We cannot even
verify that they are not going to postpone forever the possibilities of
justice for the sake of a peace that is not attainable.
Nevertheless, we in the human rights community have to
recognize that the dilemma is there. Sometimes, it is a false dilemma
and we should call it what it is. But in some conflicts-and I think
the Northern Uganda conflict is one of them' 0-the dilemma is very
real. In such a case, we owe it to ourselves to insist on our principles,
but also to be able to enter into a dialogue and recognize that there
are urgent demands for peace that should be heeded as well. We
must recognize that no one has the perfect solution and that using
the language of trumping as if this were a poker game is really not
the solution and actually does more harm than good.
This takes me to the prevention of genocide. This very
difficult job that I am doing for the Secretary-General has shown me
that we have almost sixty years of a Genocide Convention that
supposedly has created the obligation to prevent genocide."' Yet even
10.
The International Criminal Court unsealed arrest warrants for five
senior leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army, a rebel group known for its long
insurgency against Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. As a result, some
argued that that the warrants "undermined peace efforts by alienating rebel
forces and precluding the protection offered by the Ugandan government's
Amnesty Act of 2000." H. Abigail Moy, The InternationalCriminal Court'sArrest
Warrants and Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army: Renewing Debate Over Amnesty
and Complementarity, 19 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 267, 270 (2006); see Press Release,
International Criminal Court, Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA
Commanders (Oct. 14, 2005), available at httpJ/www.icc-cpi.int/press/
pressreleases/114.html.
11.
On July 14, 2004, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed
Juan M~ndez as his Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide. His term ends
on March 31, 2007. Press Release Secretary-General, Juan E. M~ndez of
Argentina Appointed Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, U.N. Doc.
SG/A/880 (July 14, 2004), available at httpJ/www.un.orgNews/Press/docs/2004/
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12
the Convention itself does not tell us how to prevent genocide. It
places more of an emphasis on punishment for the crime of genocide,
and even there we waited for almost fifty years before we had an
important institution like the International Criminal Court that
could punish this crime. Therefore, if after all these years we have
made so little progress in punishing the crime, perhaps it is not
surprising that prevention of genocide still lags behind. But even if it
is not surprising, there is a still a very urgent need for prevention.
Unfortunately, we still have not determined the mechanisms or the
practical measures by which we can break the bottleneck of the
international community's political will. We must inspire the
international community to live up to its commitments, including the
responsibility to protect, and show that this responsibility is more
than a paper commitment, that it actually does have meaning in
specific conflicts at specific moments.

I can attest to the fact that this is a difficult task. Though I
do not doubt the Secretary-General's sincerity in giving prevention of
genocide a very high priority, the fact that he does so does not ease
the difficulty of negotiations within the Secretariat of the United
Nations. However, I must say that in promoting the prevention of
genocide, I have also drawn some lessons from the battles the human
rights movement has been fighting for the last several years or
decades. Starting with the case of Darfur, and now applying these
lessons everywhere, my office and I are attempting to mobilize the
United Nations to take measures to prevent other ethnic, racial, or
religious conflicts from degenerating into genocide.
In order to succeed in preventing genocide, I have stated that
there are four things that we have to do simultaneously. One is
protection. We must identify a population that is at risk and try to
protect it, if necessary by military or police force. The second one is
humanitarian relief because by and large these communities are
vulnerable in many different ways. Not only are they vulnerable to
mass killings, but they are already in conditions of life designed to
provoke their destruction. Therefore, not only is humanitarian relief
urgent in its own right, but also because of the way humanitarian
relief is provided in today's world, it provides a measure of protection
sga880.doc.htm.
12.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, art. I, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
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just by being witness to their plight. It provides literally thousands of
volunteers from around the world, dispensing food and medical
protection, who can bear witness to their struggle.
Third is accountability. By and large, very serious crimes
have already been committed. However, the perpetrators' sense of
impunity for those crimes is both an invitation to having them
committed again and it also creates a sense of vulnerability in the
people we're trying to protect, which does not allow them to make
decisions for themselves or decide what to do with their lives from
now on. Therefore, breaking the cycle of impunity is itself a measure
of prevention that now is aided greatly by the fact that we have at
least an institution like the International Criminal Court.
And finally, we must strive to achieve peace. Unless we work
to eliminate the ultimate cause of conflict in a society, these risks of
genocide are not going to go away. So we have to work
simultaneously on all four of these goals, each having its own
difficulties.
These new horizons merely highlight our need to go back to
the basics of human rights law, as stated early on by Lou Henkin and
others. If I may state them as I understand them, those basics are:
first, that international human rights standards are and should be
the same for all persons, regardless of race, religion, national origin,
gender, status in the country, or other grounds. Second, that for the
same reason, they create obligations on all states, large and small,
and we should not allow large or small states to fall into the
temptation of exceptionalism that says "human rights law is good,
but it is for all of you, it's not for me." In this regard, we can show
with so many examples from recent history, that the temptation of
exceptionalism often takes a country into the path of human rights
violations, lack of prestige, and lack of standing in the world. This
should be avoided at all costs. Third, is that ultimately international
law and constitutional law are intrinsically connected because it is a
national state that has the first responsibility to its own citizens and
inhabitants. Moreover, the best, most practical, and most proven way
of protecting human rights is by independent, impartial courts.
All of these lessons are insights that we learned early on from
Lou Henkin. These lessons have decisive meaning today and will
continue to have meaning as we develop even newer horizons for
human rights protection in the future.

